{"id":1458,"date":"2019-11-02T06:25:49","date_gmt":"2019-11-02T09:25:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.blogs.unicamp.br\/openphilosophy\/?p=1458"},"modified":"2020-06-04T13:24:32","modified_gmt":"2020-06-04T16:24:32","slug":"institutions-and-philosophy-freedom-and-society","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.blogs.unicamp.br\/openphilosophy\/2019\/11\/02\/institutions-and-philosophy-freedom-and-society\/","title":{"rendered":"Institutions, Philosophy, Freedom and Society (PART I)"},"content":{"rendered":"

What does it mean to talk about institutions; democratic institutions; philosophy and freedom for a democratic society? In a way, it is about the studying and teaching of philosophy we ourselves are practicing, in relation to bringing and carrying on democracy. I wonder how many ways are there to explore this theme, and how many \u201cdemocracies\u201d there would appear after all. My proposal is to reflect on the problems of philosophical learning.<\/span><\/p>\n

I mean, it is not easy when a great philosopher and authority reveals his or her most ordinary and common sense prejudices with such a boldness and assurance. Let us consider the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume\u2019s racism. How should we deal with the philosopher\u2019s opinion that Blacks were inferior to Whites? Do we need to talk about that? How should we denounce or fight it back? As an exercise against extremisms, not only this has to do with today\u2019s afro-american and other civil rights movements, or with the decolonization of thought: to consider Hume\u2019s racism is an attempt to think over what is it \u2013 a critical philosophical learning?<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us begin with Hume\u2019s own words: where, when, what is Hume\u2019s racism like?<\/span><\/p>\n

“[\u2026] there is some reason to think, that all the nations, which live beyond the polar circles or between the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species, and are incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind. The poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern, from their few necessities, may, perhaps, account for this remarkable difference [\u2026] This however is certain, that the characters of nations are very promiscuous in the temperate climates, and that almost all the general observations, which have been formed of the more southern or more northern people in these climates, are found to be uncertain and fallacious.”1<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Hume even seems careful about not ascribing any essentialism to the character of the nations, by ascertaining their intense promiscuity in the temperate climates. And he does demonstrate some hesitation about his and other\u2019s observations formed on Afro, Indians and Eskimos, by pondering the uncertainty and fallacy of them. However, there is also an “almost”, “almost all general observations are uncertain and fallacious”: that is, not all of them will be so. And this indetermination is precisely about noting an essence proper to some characters when it happens to be a \u201cracial case\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

We then read the following footnote added to this paragraph:<\/span><\/p>\n

“I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. [On the first editions it read: \u201cI am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation.\u201d \u2013 Having made this correction, from \u201call other species of men\u201d to \u201cnegroes\u201d are inferior to whites, the note is kept unchanged as follows] No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such an uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.”2<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This so bold and prepossessed opinion against Blacks also appears in other passages of Hume\u2019s work, but it is here that it reveals itself in its strongest colors. A few paragraphs later, the philosopher\u2019s negative impression of Blacks becomes even more evident:<\/span><\/p>\n

“You may obtain any thing of the NEGROES by offering them strong drink; and may easily prevail with them to sell, not only their children, but their wives and mistresses, for a cask of brandy.”3<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Hume\u2019s racism does not appear to be much known outside the circle of Humean scholars; and among them, this discussion seems to be held as frivolous and fruitless for a better comprehension of his work. Not only this, in an attempt to set a defense for him, they argue that Hume\u2019s racism is completely dissociated from the institution of racial slavery in South-Central-North America, because the philosopher would oppose himself to slavery.<\/span><\/p>\n

This argument is based on a passage of his essay on \u201cThe populousness of ancient nations\u201d, but it seems quite inconclusive to me since the philosopher is referring to the slavery of Whites, of \u201cfellow creatures\u201d as he says, and not a word is ever said about the modern slavery overburdening Blacks\u2019 lives.4<\/sup><\/a> All this sounds very weird: to try a defense for the philosopher in a fallacious way, and to ignore the significance of such a topic in the studying and teaching of his philosophy.<\/span><\/p>\n

The insistence of re-accessing Hume\u2019s unsympathetic feelings for Indians, Eskimos and especially for Blacks may be justified by the oddity that it would be to see it and say nothing. The persistence of racism and other racial injustices, and the forgetfulness of history are two concerns among many of us that may justify this.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is really surprising that such a nice and gentle philosopher as Hume happens to speak so grossly like this. Considering it in its proper argumentative context, Hume\u2019s racism is the observation of an exception, it is part of the philosopher\u2019s solution to a problem. All differences between national characters would be produced, caused by morality, that is, they are cultural, socially acquired, artificial; not natural or original.<\/span><\/p>\n

In fact, this position was quite new for Hume\u2019s age, while many thinkers still embraced the opinion that human differences were due to the influence of physical nature (air and climate). The only exception in Hume\u2019s views is when human differences are to be accounted for the different human complexions or races.<\/span><\/p>\n

It shocks a little to see how Hume\u2019s fine taste for paradoxes and contradictions, recurrently avoiding categorical generalizations, manifests itself so disagreeable this time. The philosopher never got so far as to draw a taxonomy of human races, he only mentions his belief on a second source of human differences. He is really acknowledging racial-natural-original differences to exist, besides moral-acquired differences. One important observation is that the racial-natural-original difference element noticed by Hume seems to be precisely an inability for acquiring morals. Thus, there are the nations which mingle themselves with one another, and there are the nations that cannot mingle. Those inhabit in Asia and Europe, and these, on the borders of Europe and Asia. Hume\u2019s racism is not dissociated from an ethnocentrism.<\/span><\/p>\n

Behind, beneath, or rather across this line of argumentation, there is a genuine philosophical problem: how does a nation come to have a character; how morality is possible; how does a variety of individuals unite themselves in one same society up to the point that they acquire characteristic national manners; what is the origin of society?<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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1<\/a> Hume, \u201cOf national character\u201d. In: <\/span>Essays Moral, Political and Literary.<\/i><\/span> Edited by Eugene Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987, p. 207. (From now on, <\/span>referred<\/span> only as \u201cOf national character\u201d)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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2<\/a> Hume, \u201cOf national character\u201d, pp. 208 and 629.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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3<\/a> Hume, \u201cOf national character\u201d, p. 214.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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4<\/a> See the footnote to Hume\u2019s footnote on the Blacks inferiority, by the <\/i>most recent editor of Hume\u2019s Essays<\/i>, Eugene Miller.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What does it mean to talk about institutions; democratic institutions; philosophy and freedom for a democratic society? In a way, it is about the studying and teaching of philosophy we ourselves are practicing, in relation to bringing and carrying on democracy. I wonder how many ways are there to explore this theme, and how many \u201cdemocracies\u201d there would appear after all. My proposal is to reflect on the problems of philosophical learning. I mean, it is not easy when a…<\/p>\n

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